Is judicial inefficacy increasing the weight of the house property market in Spain? Evidence at the local level

Juan Mora-Sanguinetti

SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, 2012, vol. 3, issue 3, 339-365

Abstract: The weight of the housing tenancy market in Spain is very low. It is frequently argued that an ineffective judicial system, implying a cumbersome procedure to evict a non-paying tenant or simply requiring a long period to execute a decision, may be an important determinant of the tenancy market’s weakness, as it constrains the effective supply by reducing the profitability of landlords. This research studies this effect econometrically using a panel data approach and exploring differences in judicial efficacy among the Spanish provinces. After controlling for several other factors, this study concludes that the degree of inefficacy of the judicial system has a positive impact on the property share among provinces in Spain. Copyright The Author(s) 2012

Keywords: Judicial efficacy; Property market; Tenancy market; Contract enforcement; K40; R21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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DOI: 10.1007/s13209-011-0063-6

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