Sharing a polluted river through environmental taxes

María Gómez-Rúa

SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, 2013, vol. 4, issue 2, 137-153

Abstract: n agents located along a river generate residues that then require cleaning to return the river to its natural state, which entails some cost. We propose several rules to distribute the total pollutant-cleaning cost among all the agents. We provide axiomatic characterizations using properties based on water taxes. Moreover, we prove that one of the rules coincides with the weighted Shapley value of a game associated with the problem. Copyright The Author(s) 2013

Keywords: Cost sharing; Pollutant-cleaning cost; Water taxes; C71; D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s13209-011-0083-2

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