Voting over law enforcement: mission impossible

Hakan Inal

SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, 2015, vol. 6, issue 3, 349-360

Abstract: Median voter theorem has been used in many economic environments including law enforcement. Assumptions of the median voter theorem, however, are generally violated in law enforcement models. Moreover, it is impossible to have agents with “opposite equilibrium preferences” over enforcement levels in law enforcement models. These limitations on the use of preferences over law enforcement raises questions about the robustness and validity of law enforcement models. Copyright The Author(s) 2015

Keywords: Public enforcement; Equilibrium preferences; Enforcement equilibrium; Median voter theorem; Single-peaked preferences; Single-crossing property; D62; D7; K14; K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s13209-015-0128-z

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