Impossibility theorems with countably many individuals

Uuganbaatar Ninjbat ()

SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, 2018, vol. 9, issue 3, No 4, 333-350

Abstract: Abstract The problem of social choice is studied on a domain with countably many individuals. In contrast to most of the existing literature which establish either non-constructive possibilities or approximate (i.e. invisible) dictators, we show that if one adds a continuity property to the usual set of axioms, the classical impossibilities persist in countable societies. Along the way, a new proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem in the style of Peter Fishburn’s well known proof of Arrow’s impossibility theorem is obtained.

Keywords: Arrow’s impossibility theorem; The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem; Infinite society; Continuity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:series:v:9:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s13209-018-0182-4

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DOI: 10.1007/s13209-018-0182-4

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