Zur Eignung von Aktienoptionsplänen als Motivationsinstrument für Manager

Stefan Winter ()
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Stefan Winter: Institut für Management

Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 1998, vol. 50, issue 12, 1120-1142

Abstract: Summary In a “selective dealer system” the number of dealers selling products of a particular manufacturer is limited compared with an ”unrestricted distribution system”. This paper discusses reasons of manufacturers and dealers to engage in such a distribution arrangement. We find out that dealers generally prefer a “selective dealer system” since competitive pressure at the dealer stage is weakened. The manufacturer benefits indirectly from such a system since the behavior of the dealers change. It is demonstrated in two scenarios that the manufacturer might have an incentive to build up a “selective dealer system” because it induces dealers to invest in marketing for the manufacturer’s products and in the product’s reputation.

Date: 1998
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DOI: 10.1007/BF03371551

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