Zur verzerrten Performancemessung in Agency-Modellen

Michael Kopel

Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 1998, vol. 50, issue 6, 531-550

Abstract: Summary A central assumption in many models on incentive contracting is that the principal’s objective is always a contractible performance measure. In many situations this assumption is not supportable, and for an evaluation of the agent’s effort alternative and oftentimes distortionary performance measures must be used. Under these circumstances the question arises which factors determine the quality of a good performance measure. We show that the quality of such an alternative measure is determined by the fact how it responds to the agent’s actions in relation to the way the principal’s objective responds to these actions. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that, in general, inefficiency occurs even if the agent is risk neutral.

Date: 1998
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DOI: 10.1007/BF03371520

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