Garantien als Signale für die Produktqualität?

Martin Nell
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Martin Nell: Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 1999, vol. 51, issue 10, 937-962

Abstract: Summary This paper deals with the question, whether warranties can be used to signal the (unobservable) quality of a product to the consumers. Although this question is usually answered in the positive in the literature, it is shown that the superficial plausibility of the mainstream signalling hypothesis can not be confirmed once we apply a thorough formal analYSis. This result which is derived by game theoretic analysis has practical implications for firm's marketing activities as well as for the design of warranties implied by law. Furthermore the results show that signalling arguments should be used with much more caution. This is presumably true not only for warranties but for other areas of research too.

Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1007/BF03371605

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