Opportunismus in langfristigen Geschäftsbeziehungen

Heribert Gierl
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Heribert Gierl: Universität Augsburg

Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 2000, vol. 52, issue 2, 107-140

Abstract: Summary Opportunistic behaviour of an exchange partner is widely recognised as a potential problem in buyer-supplier relationships. One party has an incentive to act opportunistically if there is an asymmetric relationship of dependence. According to transaction cost economics vertical integration is a possibility to face this problem. But some authors suggest that there are other ways to control the problem of opportunism, e.g. investments in the quality of personal relationships or offsetting investments. We describe these possibilities and the circumstances in which they may be superior. To prove our theory, we conducted an empirical study. The findings show that detailed contractual safeguards should be best when the supplier can observe the behaviour of the buyer, or in cases in which the buyer is of great importance in the future. Good relationship quality has an advantage if the buyer is acting in a high competitive environment.

Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1007/BF03372610

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