Vom Nutzen (un-)informierter Agenten: Eine informationsökonomische Betrachtung des Controllings

Ulf Schiller ()
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Ulf Schiller: Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen

Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 2001, vol. 53, issue 1, 3-19

Abstract: Summary This paper introduces a central task of management accounting, namely, information management (IM). IM serves as a link between the firm’s information and decision systems. It decides which information should be made available to a decentralized decision unit and which not. Hence, situations of asymmetric information arise or are removed. This has indirect efficiency effects. Poorly informed managers risk to acquire lossmaking projects, while well informed managers try to use their informational advantage to build up perquisites. The coordinating central task is to trade off the two inefficiencies.

JEL-codes: D8 M4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1007/BF03372639

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