Zur Bewertung von Mehrstimmrechten

Thomas Hering and Michael Olbrich
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Thomas Hering: Fern-Universität Hagen
Michael Olbrich: Fern-Universität Hagen

Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 2001, vol. 53, issue 1, 20-38

Abstract: Summary Article 11 No. 1 of KonTraG makes it easier to abolish multiple voting rights in return for a decent compensation. The valuation of multiple voting rights, which is necessary for fixing the amount of compensation, is a purchase/sale type of conflict that can occur either in a fragmented or a non-fragmented constellation. The authors show with their model that a corporation will pay a compensation only in those cases when multiple vote shareholders hold a minority of voting capital and are as well able to prove that their dividends decrease due to the abolition of the multiple voting rights because of a change in corporate governance. It is shown how the amount of compensation must be determined both in case of a perfect and an imperfect capital market. The theoretical results are compared with empirical findings.

JEL-codes: G31 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:53:y:2001:i:1:d:10.1007_bf03372640

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DOI: 10.1007/BF03372640

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