Zur Funktion von Studiengebühren angesichts von Informationsasymmetrien auf Humankapitalmärkten

Egon Franck and Christian Opitz
Additional contact information
Christian Opitz: TU Bergakademie Freiberg

Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 2001, vol. 53, issue 2, 91-106

Abstract: Summary Institutions of Higher Education certify students’ quality by issuing degrees and other credentials. Information asymmetries between the university and its clients, however, require valid signals of the universities’ quality, too. A performance based university compensation scheme can be viewed as a bonding-mechanism. Tuition which is not contingent on the value added through Higher Education extenuates the mechanism’s efficiency. We show that tuition nevertheless can create economic value, preventing an adverse selection of wealthy but less talented students and individuals who consume education rather than investing in future earnings. In addition, tuition increases the signaling content of some degrees. Individuals from groups more likely to consume education, like women for example, are able to signal their intention to engage in a lasting and demanding career. Thus, the allocation in some segments of the labor market can be improved.

JEL-codes: D23 D82 I21 J24 J79 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF03372643 Abstract (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:53:y:2001:i:2:d:10.1007_bf03372643

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.springer.com/journal/41471

DOI: 10.1007/BF03372643

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().