Investitionssteuerung, Motivation und Periodenerfolgsrechnung bei ungleichen Zeitpräferenzen

Robert M. Gillenkirch () and Matthias M. Schabel ()
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Robert M. Gillenkirch: Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main

Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 2001, vol. 53, issue 3, 216-245

Abstract: Summary This paper considers the role of accrual accounting in providing investment incentives. In a simple multiperiod principal-agent-framework, an agent has to exert effort to gain access to investment opportunities and makes investment decisions. The agent discounts future cash flows at a higher interest rate than the principal. The principal designs a linear performance fee based on either cash flows or residual income. Two concepts of incentive design are analyzed, goal congruence and preference similarity. It is shown, how the two concepts differ with respect to investment and effort incentives, and how accrual accounting improves the solution to the principal’s problem.

Keywords: D82; D92; G31; M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1007/BF03372648

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