Kapitalmarktorientierte Unternehmenspublizität und der Informationsverbund zwischen in- und externem Rechnungswesen

Alexis H. Kunz and Thomas Pfeiffer
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Alexis H. Kunz: Fachhochschule Aargau
Thomas Pfeiffer: Universität Zürich

Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 2001, vol. 53, issue 5, 500-530

Abstract: Summary Recent revisions in German accounting laws are heavily promoting the informational function of financial accounting systems. Until now possibly detrimental ramifications of such regulations for a firm’s internal governance structures have not been investigated. We develop a game-theoretical model which explicitly accounts for information transfers between a firm’s financial accounting system and its management accounting system. The subsequent analysis identifies conditions under which a firm’s internal allocation processes are either detrimentally or beneficially affected when federal laws force a firm to credibly report finer information to the capital markets.

Keywords: D23; G31; M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:53:y:2001:i:5:d:10.1007_bf03372657

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DOI: 10.1007/BF03372657

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