Strategisches Verhalten bei der Unternehmenssanierung durch außergerichtlichen Vergleich
Stefan Wielenberg ()
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Stefan Wielenberg: Otto-von-Guericke Universität Magdeburg
Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 2001, vol. 53, issue 6, 605-631
Abstract:
Summary Out-of-court negotiations are frequently used to restructure the debt of a financially distressed firm. This paper discusses out-of-court debt negotiations in a setting of asymmetric information. In the model, the debtor is better informed about his firm’s financial situation than the creditor. Thus, the debtor might try to understate his real financial situation in debt-renegotiations. If only the debtor offers the terms of the restructuring agreement, the creditor will be left in a position as if the firm was liquidated in a judicial bankruptcy procedure. However, the creditor’s share of the negotiation surplus rises if the creditor can commit himself to reject offers below a minimum offer or has the ability to screen the debtor by repeated offers. In this case, the debtor has incentives to offer liquidity to the creditor that would be unverifiable in a judicial bankruptcy procedure.
Keywords: D82; G33; G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:53:y:2001:i:6:d:10.1007_bf03372661
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DOI: 10.1007/BF03372661
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