„Never Change a Winning Team“ — Team-Entlohnung und implizite Kooperation

Dirk Sliwka ()
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Dirk Sliwka: Universität Bonn

Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 2001, vol. 53, issue 8, 777-797

Abstract: Summary The optimal incentives for a team are analyzed in a principal-agent model. It is shown that it can be beneficial to make an agent’s compensation positively dependent on another agent’s success even when tasks are technologically independent. The introduction of team compensation induces implicit cooperation and mutual monitoring. This is modeled explicitly in a repeated game. Team compensation can be optimal even in cases, where in the static model relative performance evaluation is preferred. It is the more beneficial the higher the probability of an ongoing relationship.

Keywords: D23; M12; I33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1007/BF03372668

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