Strategische Kostenanpassung oder relative Leistungsbewertung — Was ist besser?

Stefan Dierkes ()
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Stefan Dierkes: Philipps-Universität Marburg

Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 2004, vol. 56, issue 1, 45-59

Abstract: Summary To control decentralized investment or profit center decisions it is recommended to give managers a share in their own profits. But in imperfectly competitive product markets it is better for the rivals to use a relative performance evaluation or a performance evaluation based on adjusted costs. It is still unknown which of these incentive schemes has more benefit for a firm. This article shows that in the case of a symmetric duopoly the relative performance evaluation is superior to the performance evaluation based on adjusted costs and that the uniform choice of the relative performance evaluation is a nash equilibrium.

Keywords: M41; C7; Relative Leistungsbewertung; Strategische Kostenanpassung; Strategische Transferpreise; Strategisches Verhalten (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/BF03372729

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