Opportunismus und Verhandlungsmacht in F&E-Lieferbeziehungen — Eine empirische Untersuchung

Martin Kloyer
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Martin Kloyer: Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena

Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 2004, vol. 56, issue 4, 333-364

Abstract: Summary There are many types of opportunistic behaviour in R&D-supplier-buyer-relations, on both sides. Suppliers and buyers who anticipate this do not invest efficiently. Agency-theory has developed various instruments to reduce opportunism. On this basis, the paper presents a model of a bilateral monopoly which is founded on intellectual property rights for the supplier and exclusive rights for the buyer. Empirical results confirm this model and show how deviations are connected with power asymmetries at the time of contract conclusion.

Keywords: O32; Agency Theory; Bargaining Power; Bilateral Monopoly; Information Asymmetries; Instititional Economics; Opportunism; R&D-Supplier-Buyer-Relations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/BF03372740

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