Board Responsibility for Irresponsibility: The Link Between Board Structure and Corporate Scandals

Gregor Dorfleitner () and Christian Kreuzer ()
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Gregor Dorfleitner: University of Regensburg
Christian Kreuzer: University of Regensburg

Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, 2024, vol. 76, issue 3, 433-461

Abstract: Abstract Based on an international data set that comprises over 6,100 companies located in 44 countries in the years 2002–2018, this paper analyzes the relation between corporate scandals and board structures besides further firm-related, political, nation-level economic, and cultural variables. We identify board structure variables that are positively associated with a firm’s corporate scandals, namely high CSR efforts and busy board members. There are also variables that are negatively associated with this kind of behavior, namely qualified and skilled boards. No clear evidence can be determined from a board’s gender diversity, independent board members, and board size.

Keywords: ESG controversies; Corporate controversies; Board structure; Corporate scandals; Within-between model; Hybrid regression model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s41471-024-00192-4

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