Parental bargaining and child health: a theoretical note

Biswajit Mandal, Bhaskar Bhattacharyya and Saswati Chaudhuri ()
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Saswati Chaudhuri: St. Xavier’s College (Autonomous)

SN Business & Economics, 2024, vol. 4, issue 4, 1-17

Abstract: Abstract We attempt to determine how parental bargaining impacts the allocation of the family budget on child health. We developed a standard utility maximization problem for a representative family using a Cobb–Douglas utility function. We find that the child health is not affected by the bargaining power of the parents and their individual preferences. Rather, parental income and the output elasticity of child health input increases child health. The theoretical findings observed in the study are corroborated by suitable empirical findings.

Keywords: Mother’s autonomy; Parental bargaining; Health demand; Child health (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I12 I15 I18 J12 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s43546-024-00637-2

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