Social Choice and Welfare

1984 - 2026

Current editor(s): Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

From:
Springer
The Society for Social Choice and Welfare
Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Investment incentives in contests pp. 241-267: Derek J. Clark, Tapas Kundu and Johann Reindl
Binary public decisions with a status quo: Undominated mechanisms without harm pp. 269-294: Efthymios Athanasiou and Giacomo Valletta
Prosecutorial discretion: a theoretical and experimental investigation pp. 295-328: Stanton Hudja, Jason Ralston, Jason A. Aimone, Charles M. North and Lucas Rentschler
Strategic timing of disclosure in belief formation pp. 329-364: Maya Jalloul
Simple manipulations of Walrasian equilibrium rules in assignment problems pp. 365-393: Marina Núñez, Francisco Robles and Laura Robles
A unified understanding of majority rule, CP majority rule, and their variants pp. 395-424: Takahiro Suzuki, Yu Oliver Maemura and Masahide Horita
On weighted multidimensional inequality comparisons of heterogeneous households pp. 425-448: Ernesto Savaglio
Experimental estimation of preferences on population health ethics pp. 449-492: Rory Allanson and Matthew Robson
New results on effort provision and incentivisation in Tullock two-group contests pp. 493-544: Davide Bosco, Fausto Cavalli, Mario Gilli and Ahmad Naimzada

Envy-free cake cutting: a polynomial number of queries with high probability pp. 1-20: Guillaume Chèze
Anonymous implementation pp. 21-45: Mehmet Barlo, Nuh Aygün Dalkıran and Muhammed Dönmez
Bayesian persuasion followed by receiver’s mechanism design pp. 47-78: Takuro Yamashita and Shuguang Zhu
Robust voting under uncertainty pp. 79-100: Satoshi Nakada, Shmuel Nitzan and Takashi Ui
Optimal democratic mechanisms: should minorities propose first? pp. 101-141: Hans Gersbach, Stephan Imhof and Oriol Tejada
An evaluation of Borda count variations using ranked choice voting data pp. 143-166: N. Bradley Fox and Benjamin Bruyns
Consistent desirability relation in games with multiple levels of approval and achievable hierarchies pp. 167-194: Joseph Siani, Narcisse Tedjeugang and Bertrand Tchantcho
Dissolving a bilateral partnership pp. 195-212: Harshika Dalakoti
The hidden curse of French inter-communal power pp. 213-239: Zineb Abidi Perier and Vincent Merlin

Implementer selection in committee decision: the trade-off between transparency and committee size pp. 775-836: Yufeng Sun
Using ordinal voting to compare the utilitarian welfare of a status quo and a proposed policy: a simple nonparametric analysis pp. 837-845: Charles F. Manski
Proportionality in multiple dimensions to design electoral systems pp. 847-881: Javier Cembrano, José Correa, Gonzalo Díaz and Victor Verdugo
Multidimensional fairness with respect for individual preferences pp. 883-909: Bram De Rock and Domenico Moramarco
Need-blind college admissions, financial aid and student loan programs pp. 911-952: Eun Jeong Heo and In-Uck Park
Optimal weights in a two-tier voting system with mean-field voters pp. 953-993: Werner Kirsch and Gabor Toth
The Chair Allocation problem pp. 995-1028: Francis Bloch, David Cantala and Damián Gibaja
Arbiter assignment pp. 1029-1058: Mustafa Oguz Afacan, Nejat Anbarci and Özgür Kıbrıs
Optimal impartial correspondences pp. 1059-1081: Javier Cembrano, Felix Fischer and Max Klimm

Egalitarian-in-deviation rules relative to a reference system for resolving conflicting claims problems pp. 549-582: Josep M. Izquierdo and Carlos Rafels
A Note on Obvious Manipulations of Quantile Stable Mechanisms pp. 583-589: R. Pablo Arribillaga and Eliana Pepa Risma
Comparing social preferences: incompleteness and intransitivity pp. 591-617: Linus Thierry Nana Noumi
An axiomatic characterization of the proportional threshold methods: a geometric approach pp. 619-645: Susumu Cato, Stéphane Gonzalez, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal
Candidate monotonicity and proportionality for lotteries and non-resolute rules pp. 647-661: Jannik Peters
Core equivalence in a mixed club economy pp. 663-697: Anuj Bhowmik and Sandipan Saha
Bidding with coalitional externalities: a strategic approach to partition function form games pp. 699-721: Yuan Ju and David Wettstein
Neighborhood top trading cycles pp. 723-743: Peng Liu
Ordering distributions on a finitely generated cone pp. 745-774: Ramses Abul Naga

Optimal enfranchisement pp. 275-306: Marc Fleurbaey and Ulysse Lojkine
Divided we stand: a fiscal bargaining model for heterogeneous countries pp. 307-347: Jakob Vanschoonbeek
The Banks set and the bipartisan set may be disjoint pp. 349-355: Felix Brandt and Florian Grundbacher
A combinatorial topology approach to Arrow’s impossibility theorem pp. 357-394: Sergio Rajsbaum and Armajac Raventós-Pujol
An extension of May’s Theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting pp. 395-422: Wesley H. Holliday and Eric Pacuit
Network-based allocation of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions pp. 423-472: Rosa van den Ende, Antoine Mandel and Agnieszka Rusinowska
Implementation of welfare maximizing networks pp. 473-488: Jens Leth Hougaard and Mich Tvede
Inequality decomposition analysis, the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient pp. 489-511: Marc Fleurbaey, Peter Lambert, Domenico Moramarco and Vito Peragine
When can an outsider bribe voters one by one at a negligible cost? pp. 513-547: Myeonghwan Cho and Sangwon Park

Approval compatible voting rules pp. 1-26: Zoi Terzopoulou, Jérôme Lang and William S. Zwicker
Lobbying: influence under micro-targeting pp. 27-72: Priyanka Joshi
Clustering in communication networks with different-minded participants pp. 73-107: Thibault Laurent and Elena Panova
Utilitarianism or egalitarianism? A new characterization of the mixed utilitarian-maximin social welfare orderings pp. 109-126: Noriaki Kiguchi and Kensei Nakamura
Community enforcement and the cost of cooperation pp. 127-153: Alessandro Gioffré and Alessandro Tampieri
Identifying the distribution of welfare from discrete choice pp. 155-195: Bart Capéau, Liebrecht De Sadeleer and Sebastiaan Maes
Equilibria and group welfare in vote trading systems pp. 197-221: Matthew I. Jones
Campaign contributions and policy divergence pp. 223-253: Tsz-Ning Wong and Nikolay Marinov
Lack of opportunities, non-paternalism, and priority to the worst off pp. 255-274: Paolo Giovanni Piacquadio