Information transmission and incentives not to price discriminate

Iñaki Aguirre

Spanish Economic Review, 1999, vol. 1, issue 3, 283-299

Abstract: This paper analyzes how the pricing policy of an incumbent may signal information not only on the demand level but also on the demand composition. A signalling game with two periods and two players (an established firm and a potential entrant) is considered. The potential entrant has incomplete information on market demand. There exist many sequential equilibria in which the uniform price policy acts as an entry deterrence device by hiding actual market profitability. We can interpret the uniform pricing policy as a rejection of the use of superior information on market demand composition in order to reduce the entrant's expected profits.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; price discrimination; entry deterrence; uniform pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-12-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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