Corporate merger, organizational form, and control of labor

Juan Bárcena-Ruiz and María Garzon ()

Spanish Economic Review, 2000, vol. 2, issue 2, 129-144

Abstract: This paper shows that, when two firms merge, the increase in the bargaining strength of the multiproduct firm arising from the merger when negotiating uniform wages with the workers is one of the reasons that account for corporate mergers. Moreover, there is a strategic variable that can be used to decrease union rents in the case of merging, namely, the organization of production decisions.

Keywords: Mergers; multiproduct firms; wage bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J51 L22 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-09-20
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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