General allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: path-independence and related topics

Carmen Herrero ()

Spanish Economic Review, 2002, vol. 4, issue 1, 19-40

Abstract: We face the problem of allocationg a fixed amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. We survey the three different cases studied in the literature: the pure distribution case, the redistribution case, and the gerneral case. The so called general case provide with a natural framework to analyze the idea of path-independence. In this framework, we explore the existence of rules fulfilling this property. Our first result is negative: a strong version of this property cannot be fulfilled together with efficiency. Nonetheless, some restricted versions of the path-independence property are compatible with interesting properties, in particular no manipulability, and no envy. We then identify two solutions satisfying this sort of property: the equal distance rule, and a new extension of the uniform rule.

Keywords: Single-peaked preferences; allocation rules; path-independence; strategy-proofness; no envy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D45 D63 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-04-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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