Preference revelation with a limited number of indifference classes

Donald E.Campbell () and Jerry S. Kelly ()
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Donald E.Campbell: Department of Economics, The College of William and Mary, P.O. Box 8755 Williamsburg, VA 23181-8755, USA Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Maxwell Hall, Syracuse, NY x13244-1090, USA
Jerry S. Kelly: Department of Economics, The College of William and Mary, P.O. Box 8755 Williamsburg, VA 23181-8755, USA Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Maxwell Hall, Syracuse, NY x13244-1090, USA

Spanish Economic Review, 2002, vol. 4, issue 2, 151-158

Abstract: Suppose that g is a strategy-proof social choice rule on the domain of all profiles of complete and transitive binary relations that have exactly m indifference classes. If $m \ge 3$ and the range of g has three or more members, then g is dictatorial. If m = 2, then for any set X of feasible alternatives, there exist non-dictatorial and strategy-proof rules that are sensitive to the preferences of every individual and which have X as range.

Keywords: Dictatorship; indifference classes; oligarchy; strategy-proof (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-07-24
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