Incentive contrats and strictly proper scoring rules

Robert Clemen ()

TEST: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, 2002, vol. 11, issue 1, 167-189

Keywords: Scoring Rules; agency theory; revelation games; incentives; expert information; 62C99 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/BF02595735

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