Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games

Ignacio García-Jurado (), Natividad Llorca, Ana Meca, Manuel Pulido and Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano

TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, 2009, vol. 17, issue 1, 85-95

Keywords: Repeated games; Absentminded players; Folk theorems; Unilateral commitments; 91A20; C72; C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1007/s11750-009-0086-3

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