Coalitional games and contracts based on individual deviations

Emiliya Lazarova, Peter Borm and Bas Velzen

TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, 2011, vol. 19, issue 2, 507-520

Keywords: Stability; Contracts; Coalitional games; 91A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11750-010-0149-5

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