Stable sets and max-convex decompositions of TU games

Francesc Llerena () and Carles Rafels ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francesc Llerena Garrés

TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, 2013, vol. 21, issue 2, 313-322

Abstract: We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a max-convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas’ five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed. Copyright Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 2013

Keywords: Coalitional games; Convex games; Stable sets; Core; 91A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1007/s11750-011-0177-9

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