On the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium

Julio González-Díaz and Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez ()

TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, 2014, vol. 22, issue 1, 128-143

Abstract: Often, perfect Bayesian equilibrium is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given some beliefs in which Bayes rule is applied “whenever possible.” We argue that there are situations in which it is not clear what “whenever possible” means. Then we provide an elementary definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for general extensive games that refines both weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Copyright Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 2014

Keywords: Non-cooperative game theory; Equilibrium concepts; Perfect Bayesian; Bayes rule; 91A10; 91A18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s11750-011-0239-z

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