A constrained egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games

R. Branzei, N. Llorca, Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano and S. Tijs

TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, 2014, vol. 22, issue 3, 860-874

Abstract: This paper deals with a constrained egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games named the d value. It is proved that the d value of a convex multi-choice game belongs to the precore, Lorenz dominates each other element of the precore and possesses a population monotonicity property regarding players’ participation levels. Furthermore, an axiomatic characterization is given where a specific consistency property plays an important role. Copyright Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 2014

Keywords: Multi-choice games; Convex games; Lorenz domination; Constrained egalitarian solution; 91A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:22:y:2014:i:3:p:860-874

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DOI: 10.1007/s11750-013-0302-z

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