Fall back proper equilibrium
Peter Borm () and
Ruud Hendrickx ()
Additional contact information
John Kleppe: Tilburg University
Ruud Hendrickx: Tilburg University
TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, 2017, vol. 25, issue 2, 402-412
Abstract Proper equilibrium plays a prominent role in the literature on non-cooperative games. The underlying thought experiment in which the players play a passive role is, however, unsatisfying, as it gives no justification for its fundamental idea that severe mistakes are made with a significantly smaller probability than innocuous ones. In this paper, we introduce a more active role for the players, leading to the refinement of fall back proper equilibrium.
Keywords: Proper equilibrium; Fall back proper equilibrium; 91A10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11750-017-0447-2 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Working Paper: Fall back proper equilibrium (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:25:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11750-017-0447-2
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research is currently edited by Juan José Salazar González and Gustavo Bergantiños
More articles in TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research from Springer, Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().