On symmetric stochastic games of resource extraction with weakly continuous transitions

Anna Jaśkiewicz and Andrzej Nowak

TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, 2018, vol. 26, issue 2, No 6, 239-256

Abstract: Abstract We study stochastic games of resource extraction, in which the players have identical preferences. The transition probability is either non-atomic or a convex combination of transition probabilities depending on the investment with coefficients also dependent on the investment. Our approach covers the unbounded utility case, which was not examined in this class of games beforehand. We prove the existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in a non-randomised class of strategies.

Keywords: Stochastic game; Resource extraction game; Stationary Markov perfect equilibrium; Weakly continuous transition probability; 91A15; 91A25; 91A50; 91B62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s11750-017-0465-0

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