Power Indices in the European Union

Flavio Pressacco ()

Transition Studies Review, 2004, vol. 11, issue 3, 95-113

Abstract: We analyze the power of the countries in the decisional mechanism of the European Council along an evolutionary path from the old conventional votes mechanism prevailing in the 15-countries European Union via the rules defined in the Nice treaty for various possible enlargements to the future decisional rules defined in the Constitutional Chart, which will become effective from 2009. The theoretical tools applied are the power indices of Banzhaf and Coleman and Shapley and Shubik within the frame of the multicriteria-weighted-majority games. The results unequivocally show a path moving from a power transfer from the more to the less populated countries toward a country power corresponding to the population numerosity. Copyright Springer-Verlag/Wien 2004

Keywords: EU Constitutional Chart; power index; EU enlargement; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s11300-004-0007-y

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