A Multi-Indicator, Non-Cooperative Game Model to Resolve Conflicts for Aquifer Restoration

Hamid Kardan Moghaddam (), Saman Javadi (), Timothy O. Randhir and Neda Kavehkar
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Hamid Kardan Moghaddam: Water Research Institute
Saman Javadi: University of Tehran
Timothy O. Randhir: University of Massachusetts
Neda Kavehkar: Ministry of Energy

Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), 2022, vol. 36, issue 14, No 9, 5543 pages

Abstract: Abstract Climatic and environmental stresses on water resources, increasing water demands, and farmers' adverse economic conditions are significant drivers of increased conflicts between farmers and water managers. These conflicts remain a major hurdle in sustaining water resources, which should be addressed using sustainable development concepts. A non-cooperative game model is developed to address these conflicts and to reduce the stress on an aquifer in the arid zone using sustainable development criteria (environmental, social, and economic dimensions). The multi-indicator game model extends the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution for solving conflicts using aquifer sustainability and socioeconomic indicators as satisfaction indicators for water resources managers and the farmers, respectively. Quantitative and qualitative sustainability indicators were assessed for aquifer restoration strategies. A social satisfaction indicator was also evaluated for each strategy by using a questionnaire. Groundwater withdrawal reduction, improving the artificial recharging system, optimizing the cropping pattern, and combining these strategies in two states with and without financial incentives to the farmers were assessed using a non-cooperative game to restore the aquifer. The strategy of optimizing the cropping pattern and the combined strategy of a 1% reduction in groundwater withdrawal and improving the artificial recharging were the first and second priorities, respectively. In the selected strategy, quantitative sustainability indictor, qualitative sustainability indicator and economical indictor were obtained for the government 0.53, 0.08 and 0.69 respectively. In this strategy, social satisfaction and economic indicators were 0.7 and 0.71 for farmers. The sensitivity analysis of the developed game model showed that by increasing the power of water resource managers, the groundwater withdrawal reduction strategies become the equilibrium point for the conflict solution. This result can be used to resolve conflicts and to achieve quantitative and qualitative sustainability in aquifer management.

Keywords: Aquifer restoration; Asymmetric Nash; Groundwater management; Multi-indicator game model; Sustainability of aquifer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s11269-022-03310-1

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