Feste Benzinpreise für einen Tag — Mehr Preiswettbewerb durch die 24h-Regel?

Andreas Reindl and Thomas Wein

Wirtschaftsdienst, 2012, vol. 92, issue 10, 678-686

Abstract: The German Cartel Office’s recent study of retail gasoline markets provides strong evidence of an oligopoly in which the major suppliers coordinate pricing strategies and achieve supracompetitive prices. Competition law enforcement does not provide effective tools to improve market outcomes. We examine the potential benefits of a regulatory framework that would require gasoline suppliers to announce at a specified time their prices for the following day and prohibit price changes during a 24-hour period. Such a 24-hour rule could complicate coordination and lead to lower prices, although it cannot be ruled out that the oligopolists would adjust and develop new coordination strategies. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Keywords: D43; L13; L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1007/s10273-012-1438-4

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