EZB: Mehr Transparenz wagen

Christoph Weber
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Christoph Sebastian Weber and Christoph Weber

Wirtschaftsdienst, 2012, vol. 92, issue 12, 827-832

Abstract: The ECB is a central bank with a high level of transparency. However, it still does not publish voting records or minutes, and it publishes infl ation forecasts only on a quarterly basis. This paper argues that both the credibility and effectiveness of the ECB’s monetary policy could be enhanced by enlarging its transparency. This is especially necessary if the central bank takes such far-reaching decisions as the unlimited bond buying programme. Then the public has a right to know how and why this decision was taken. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Keywords: E52; E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1007/s10273-012-1463-3

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