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Deutschland haftet — aber warum umsonst?

Walther Otremba

Wirtschaftsdienst, 2012, vol. 92, issue 8, 527-534

Abstract: State guarantees have been proven instruments of economic policy in Germany for decades. Since the beginning of the global financial crisis, the sum of contractual, statutory and implied guarantees reached nearly 6 trillion euros. For the German government, the outstanding guarantees become ever riskier as the huge amounts of liability for banks and instable euro-states grows. Therefore it is suggested to require risk-based guarantee fees wherever possible. With the exception of Greece, most of the indebted countries and financial institutions certainly would be able to pay risk-orientated guarantee fees to avoid being cut off from capital markets. A European debt agency which earns money by giving guarantees would enhance the acceptance of the euro stabilization policy in the donor countries. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag 2012

Keywords: G28; H12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1007/s10273-012-1415-y

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