Vor der Europawahl: Wie lässt sich die demokratische Legitimität verbessern?
Markus Kotzur (),
Andreas Grimmel (),
Rudolf Hrbek (),
Michael Wohlgemuth () and
Stephan Leibfried ()
Wirtschaftsdienst, 2014, vol. 94, issue 4, 239-257
Abstract:
The EU suffers from a democratic deficit that arises not first and foremost from a lack of institutional competencies, but rather from the double weakness of politics vis-à-vis economics and law at the European level. This “functional democratic deficit” renders the existing mechanisms of democratic control increasingly ineffective. Especially for its citizens, a politically integrated Europen Union might be difficult to grasp, and it may only be reached gradually through a continuous process of dynamic development; however, “United in Diversity” seems to be the better alternative, and not only for historical reasons. The direct elections for the European Parliament, although not denying deficits of democratic legitimacy and participation at the Union level, should not be underestimated in their legitimising influence for the Union as an associated structure of members without obvious hierarchies. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014
Keywords: A14; D72; H10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:94:y:2014:i:4:p:239-257
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DOI: 10.1007/s10273-014-1664-z
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