Terminierungsentgelte im Mobilfunkmarkt

Andreas Westermeier ()

Wirtschaftsdienst, 2014, vol. 94, issue 4, 275-280

Abstract: This article analyses and compares two methods applied by national regulation authorities (NRAs) to determine mobile termination rates: “pure LRIC (long-run incremental costs)” and “LRIC+ (KeL)”. It can be shown that “pure LRIC”, favoured by the European Commission, is not coherent with standard microeconomic theory and hampers competition since “pure LRIC” does not cover all the costs borne by the mobile network operator. NRAs should apply “LRIC+” which is suited to set competition prices (since all costs are covered) and therefore guarantees the highest level of social welfare. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: D43; L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s10273-014-1667-9

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