Investitionsschutzabkommen: mehr Rechtssicherheit oder verzicht auf Souveränität?

Henning Klodt (), Martin Klein (), Marc Bungenberg (), Gabriel Felbermayr and Gerhard Schick ()

Wirtschaftsdienst, 2014, vol. 94, issue 7, 459-478

Abstract: Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS) have become highly controversial. The authors review the evidence and discuss the pros and cons of BITs and other investment agreements. Many observers are concerned that Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) regulations on investment protection could be abused by international corporations to obtain unjustifi ed compensation from EU member states. These concerns are to some extent legitimate and should be considered more seriously in the EU negotiation strategy. International investment agreements (IIA) are necessary when host countries of FDI do not have reliable and independent judicial systems. To avoid abuse and to account for the increasing role of global production chains, agreements require more precise defi nitions, and ISDS needs to be more transparent and independent. With the EU developing its own new approach independently (and differently) from the one taken in the past by its member states, the current negotiations of “mega-regionals”, as well as the fi rst standalone EU IIA with China, offer the unique possibility to answer current critique around international investment law. Is there, in the current documents, an IIA2.0 that strengthens the right to regulate and holds up high protection standards for investors? The exclusion of ISDS from TTIP negotiations risks missing a unique chance to improve the current less than perfect international investment regime. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: F21; F53; K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s10273-014-1699-1

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