Länderfi nanzausgleich, Steuerwettbewerb und Steuersalienz
Wirtschaftsdienst, 2014, vol. 94, issue 7, 492-494
Jurisdictions that engage in inter regional tax competition usually try to lessen competitive pressures by substituting salient tax instruments with hidden ones. Given this, the author investigates the effi ciency consequences of inter regional tax competition and fi scal equalisation in a federal system when taxpayers fail to optimally react to shrouded attributes of local tax policy. If the statutory tax rate is a relatively salient instrument and taxpayers pay little attention to the quality and frequency of tax enforcement, the underlying substitution of tax instruments with the aim of reducing the perceived tax price may suppress the under exploitation of tax bases that is typically triggered by fi scal equalisation. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014
Keywords: H22; H30; H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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