Staaten und Banken – ein konkreter Regulierungsvorschlag

Carl-Christoph Hedrich () and Dominic Hepp ()

Wirtschaftsdienst, 2015, vol. 95, issue 11, 758-765

Abstract: In a monetary union with a single monetary policy and bank supervision but no fiscal union, the interdependence between banks and sovereigns is a sensitive issue. Yet sovereign debt is widely exempt from bank regulation. Many banks in Europe have built up high exposures to EMU member states–which was also in the interest of the governments. The authors present a concrete proposal to break up this nexus. At the core of the approach is a capital adequacy requirement for sovereign debt instruments if certain allowances are exceeded. The authors’ primary objective is not the ultimate calibration of parameters but to provide a basis for discussion about practicable, incentive-compatible regulation. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: G21; G28; H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s10273-015-1899-3

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