Regulierungsvorschriften für europäische Staatsanleihen und ihre Wirkung

Wolfgang Disch () and Kai Schleberger ()

Wirtschaftsdienst, 2015, vol. 95, issue 7, 487-493

Abstract: Banks and governments are closely interlinked via multiple channels. On the one hand, government solvency crises can adversely affect the credit quality of banks. On the other, governments might be forced to bail out struggling banks, impairing the sustainability of public finances. The negative consequences of this sovereign-bank nexus were thrown into particularly sharp relief in the course of the financial and sovereign debt crisis. The close ties between banks and sovereigns owe much to the privileged regulatory treatment afforded to government debt securities. The current preferential treatment of sovereign debt–which includes privileges under the capital requirements and applicable large exposure limits–needs to be brought to an end. Sovereign debt is not a risk-free asset. Consequently, it needs to be backed by capital, and exposure to a single sovereign must be capped just as it is for any private debtor, over a medium to long-term horizon. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s10273-015-1853-4

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