Das Scheitern des zweiten Griechenland-Rettungspakets – eine spieltheoretische Analyse

Christian Fürtjes (), Lucas Kramer () and Heinz-Dieter Smeets ()

Wirtschaftsdienst, 2015, vol. 95, issue 8, 541-547

Abstract: The recent negotiations on the second Greek bailout package were often (erroneously) characterised as either a game of poker or chicken. In contrast, the authors interpret and analyse these negotiations as a sequential non-cooperative game with the Greek government and the institutions as the players. They discuss different pay-off structures based on ordinal preference orderings and derive the corresponding solutions to alternative settings. It can be shown that revealed preferences of both the players (initially) led to the expectation that the outcome of this game would be to provide a bailout without significant reform concessions in return. However, the unexpected announcement of the referendum by Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras led to a change in the institutions’ preferences and, in the end, to the failure of the second Greek bailout package. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: C70; F45; H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s10273-015-1863-2

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