Influence of Investment Efficiency by Managers and Accounting Conservatism on Idiosyncratic Risks to Investors
Bo-Hung Chiou and
Advances in Management and Applied Economics, 2020, vol. 10, issue 1, 8
This paper examines whether the investment efficiency of managers and accounting conservatism affect the idiosyncratic risks to investors. The empirical findings suggest the following. Firstly, overinvestment (underinvestment) by managers increases (decreases) idiosyncratic risks to investors. Secondly, accounting conservatism enhances information quality and lowers the idiosyncratic risks. Finally, accounting conservatism mitigates the investment inefficiency by manager and affects the idiosyncratic risks to investors, meaning it mitigates managerâ€™s overinvestment and lowers the idiosyncratic risks to investors. In the case of underinvestment, accounting conservatism improves managerâ€™s motivation for investment, and thus, the idiosyncratic risks to investors. Â JEL classification numbers: G32, M41, D81
Keywords: Idiosyncratic risk; Investment efficiency; Over-investment; Under-investment; Accounting conservatism. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spt:admaec:v:10:y:2020:i:1:f:10_1_8
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Advances in Management and Applied Economics from SCIENPRESS Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Eleftherios Spyromitros-Xioufis ().