AN ANALYSIS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY IN JUDICIAL LITIGATIONS THE CASE WITH LOSS DISAPPOINTMENT AVERSE PLAINTIFFS

Eric Langlais

Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics, 2010, vol. 1, issue 1, 42-50

Abstract: For psychologists bounded rationality reflects the presence of cognitive dissonance and or inconsistency revealing that people use heuristics Tversky and Kahneman 1974 rather than sophisticated processes for the assessment of their beliefs Recent research analyzing litigations and pretrial negotiations also focused on boundedly rational litigants Bar Gill 2005 Farmer and Peccorino 2002 relying on a na ve modelling of the self serving bias Our paper in contrast introduces the case for disappointment averse litigants relying on the axiomatic of Gull 1991 We show that this leads to a richer analysis in comparative statics at the same time this proves to be disappointing for the purposes of public policies in favour of the access to justice recommendations are quite ambiguous

Date: 2010
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Working Paper: An analysis of bounded rationality in judicial litigations: the case with loss/disappointment averses plaintiffs (2010)
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