WHY DO FRENCH CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES HAVE HIGHER LEVELS OF FINANCIAL EFFICIENCY

Simplice Asongu

Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics, 2011, vol. 2, issue 4, 94-108

Abstract: The dominance of English common law countries in prospects for financial development in the legal origins debate has been debunked by recent findings Using exchange rate regimes and economic monetary integration oriented hypotheses this paper proposes an inflation uncertainty theory in providing theoretical justification and empirical validity as to why French civil law countries have higher levels of financial allocation efficiency Inflation uncertainty typical of floating exchange rate regimes accounts for the allocation inefficiency of financial intermediary institutions in English common law countries As a policy implication results support the benefits of fixed exchange rate regimes in financial intermediary allocation efficiency

Date: 2011
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Working Paper: Why do French civil-law countries have higher levels of financial efficiency? (2011)
Working Paper: Why do French civil-law countries have higher levels of financial efficiency? (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:srs:jarle0:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:94-108

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