 Understanding The Problem of Social CostEnrico Baffi ()
Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics, 2013, vol. 4, issue 1, 46-52 Abstract: This paper examines the positions of Coase and Pigou in regard to the problem of external effects externalities Assessing their two most important works it appears that Coase has a more relevant preference for an evaluation of total efficiency while Pigou with some exceptions is convinced that it is almost always socially desirable to reach marginal efficiency through taxes or liability It is interesting that the economist of Chicago who has elaborated on the renowned theorem thinks that is not desirable to reach efficiency at the margin every time and that it is often preferable to evaluate the total which indicates the solution that is more welfare enhancing Certain confusion in the work of Coase is noticeable On one hand he criticizes Pigou for statements regarding the social desirability of relocating some industries away from the towns and on the other hand he suggests solutions that give an absolute right for an activity that is incompatible with the activity of another subject In this way he eliminates the possibility of having a solution that is in accordance with Coase s idea which stresses that any external effect is reciprocal The adjective reciprocal means that a damage to Y is the consequence of limiting the activity of Y in order to allow the activity of X and the opposite is also true A benefit for Y causes a damage to X Beyond this criticism Coase s arguments against Pigou s tools are represented by the famous theorem according to which a public intervention is not necessary in order to obtain efficiency when transaction costs are low However the theorem is not an idea that can be used to say that Pigou s methods are useless when transaction costs are high Indeed when transaction costs are high efficiency cannot be reached through negotiations Coase nonetheless rejects Pigou s tools for every situation Through a deep examination of the paragraphs of The Problem of Social Costs it is understandable why Coase opposes Pigou s tools First of all he considers that the remedy consisting in the compensation of the victim To Pigou s way of thinking this is a strict liability rule Coase states that the damage is caused by both parties and moreover the amount of the damage depends on both parties He understands that the compensation method described by Pigou can bring about moral hazards and therefore brings about new social costs Since the article was written in 1960 Coase s theory has been developed and has become a pillar of tort law and economics Pigou proposed a tax as an alternative remedy for external effects which does not bring about behaviour of moral hazard because the victim bears the expected costs However Coase is diffident in regard to the tax His idea was not developed by other scholars in the subsequent years Coase understands that efficiency should require a tax on the victim so that the victim considers the increase of the costs of precaution for the injurer due to creating the nuisance In other words Coase understands that the tax does not produce the socially optimal activity level of the parties if the costs of precaution of the other party are not considered as a component of the tax Therefore Coase s belief is that the tools of Pigou create so many problems as to make them inefficient Date: 2013 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:srs:jarle0:v:4:y:2013:i:1:p:46-52 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics is currently edited by Madalina Constantinescu More articles in Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics from ASERS Publishing |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.