EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Fiscal Decentralization and Corruption The Facts in Regional Autonomy in Indonesia

Bambang Suprayitno () and Rimawan Pradiptyo
Additional contact information
Bambang Suprayitno: Yogyakarta State University Depok Indonesia, Postal: ID

Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics, 2017, vol. 8, issue 5, 1467-1483

Abstract: There are tricky effects of fiscal decentralization on corruption both in concept and empirical studies This study aims to determine the influence of fiscal decentralization on corruption in local level provinces governments in Indonesia Using the Supreme Court Mahkamah Agung cassation in 2001 2009 this research applies econometric method exactly Tobit model to provide the evidence utilizing modified model of Yardstick Competition Result shows that the higher the level of fiscal decentralization will increase corruption Population also increases corruption Detection rate from neighbor area could hit the corruption State official salary level GDP per capita and literacy rates and dummy variables of special autonomy do not affect corruption Rich areas have lower levels of corruption than the poor Areas outside Java Bali non Greater Jakarta have an average lower corruption than corruption in the area on the island of Java and Bali The Greater Jakarta has higher corruption than others

Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:srs:jarle0:v:8:y:2017:i:5:p:1467-1483

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics is currently edited by Madalina Constantinescu

More articles in Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics from ASERS Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Claudiu Popirlan ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:srs:jarle0:v:8:y:2017:i:5:p:1467-1483