How Does Altruism Enlarge A Climate Coalition

Yu-Hsuan Lin

Journal of Advanced Research in Management, 2018, vol. 9, issue 3, 553-563

Abstract: This study examines the relationship between individual altruistic attitudes and the incentives of participating in a climate coalition by using a laboratory experiment A dominant strategy solution design categorizes players into two roles in the game critical and non critical players The critical players have a weakly dominant strategy of joining and are essential to an effective coalition On the other hand the non critical players have a dominant strategy of not joining The theory suggests that strong altruism would lead non critical players to join a coalition The experimental evidence shows that coalitions could be enlarged from the self interest prediction However the result indicates that the individual incentives for participation seem to be negatively correlated with altruistic attitudes The stronger the altruistic tendencies the less likely individuals are to join a coalition

Date: 2018
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Working Paper: How does Altruism Enlarge a Climate Coalition? (2018)
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